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Hermeneutical Dissent and the Species of Hermeneutical Injustice 
TRYSTAN S. GOETZE 
 
According to Miranda Fricker, a hermeneutical injustice occurs when there is a deficit in our 
shared tools of social interpretation (the collective hermeneutical resource), such that 
marginalized social groups are at a disadvantage in making sense of their distinctive and 
LPSRUWDQWH[SHULHQFHV&ULWLFVKDYHFODLPHGWKDW)ULFNHU¶VDFFRXQWLJQRUHVRUSUHFOXdes a 
phenomenon I call hermeneutical dissent, where marginalized groups have produced their 
own interpretive tools for making sense of those experiences. I clarify the nature of 
hermeneutical injustice to make room for hermeneutical dissent, clearing up the structure of 
the collective hermeneutical resource and the fundamental harm of hermeneutical injustice. I 
then provide a more nuanced account of the hermeneutical resources in play in instances of 
hermeneutical injustice, allowing six species of the injustice to be distinguished. Finally, I 
reflect on the corrective virtue of hermeneutical justice in light of hermeneutical dissent. 
 
The exclusion or marginalization of a social group from collective processes of meaning-
making can lead to a situation where no one, not even members of that group, are able to 
make intelligible sense of some of their distinctive and important experiences. This situation 
is what Miranda Fricker calls hermeneutical injustice: ³when a gap in collective interpretive 
resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their 
VRFLDOH[SHULHQFHV´ (Fricker 2007, 1). One of her examples is sexual harassment: before mid-
twentieth century feminist activists had coined that very concept, collective understanding 
provided no way to properly interpret DZRPDQ¶VH[SHULHQFHRIVH[XDOKDUDVVPHQW
particularly, the wrong the harasser does to her. These experiences thus remained barely 
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intelligible, collectively and to the women who went through them, constituting a harm to 
them in their capacity as knowers. 
 But what about cases where members of a marginalized group have successfully 
produced their own ways of interpreting their experiences, despite their hermeneutical 
marginalization? Consider, for example, the multitude of new concepts and terms that have 
been produced in LGBTQ+ communities, such as the idea of being agender. Members of 
these communities PD\XQGHUVWDQGDSHUVRQ¶VH[SHULHQFHRIgenderlessness perfectly well. 
But many who are differently situated continue to struggle to make sense of this non-binary 
gender identity. As agender activist Tyler Ford writes in an autobiographical essay for The 
Guardian: 
3HRSOHGRQ¶WNQRZZKDWWRPDNHRIPHZKHQWKH\VHHPHEHFDXVHWKH\IHHOP\
features contradict one another. They see no room for the curve of my hips to coexist 
with my facial hair; they desperately want me to be someone they can easily 
FDWHJRULVH«6WUDQJHUVDUHRIWHQGHVSHUDWHWRILJXUHRXWZKDWJHQLWDOLD,KDYHLQWKH
hope that my body holds the key to some great secret and unavoidable truth about 
P\VHOIDQGP\JHQGHU,WGRHVQ¶W0\ZRUGVKROGP\WUuth. My body is simply the 
vehicle that gives me the opportunity to express myself. (Ford 2015) 
&DOOFDVHVOLNH)RUG¶VLQVWDQFHVRIhermeneutical dissent. There are many other examples 
from feminist, queer, race, and disability theory, where hermeneutical dissent has overcome a 
collective interpretive failure.<1> But are Ford and others like them subject to hermeneutical 
injustice? 
 $FFRUGLQJWRVHYHUDOFULWLFVRI)ULFNHU¶VYLHZWKHDQVZHUZRXOGVHHPWREHnegative. 
Drawing on examples of hermeneutical dissent, José Medina (2013), Rebecca Mason (2011), 
DQG.ULVWLH'RWVRQHDFKDUJXHWKDW)ULFNHU¶VDFFRXQWRIKHUPHQHXWLFDOLQMXVWLFHHLWKHU
IDLOVWRFDSWXUHRUUXOHVRXWWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIFDVHVOLNH)RUG¶V,IWKHIRUPHULVWUXHWKHQWKLV
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is a serious oversight; if the latter is true, then )ULFNHU¶V account runs against some of the core 
commitments of feminist and other liberatory theory. Either way, hermeneutical dissent and 
its relation to hermeneutical injustice deserve our attention. 
 In this paper, I argue that we can account for cases of hermeneutical dissent as 
instances of hermeneutical injustice, provided we make three clarifications regarding the 
nature of hermeneutical injustice. First, to make our account of hermeneutical injustice 
compatible with hermeneutical dissent in the first place, I clear up our understanding of the 
collective hermeneutical resource, arguing that it consists in the interpretive tools that are 
shared by all. Second, to show how hermeneutical dissenters can still be subject to a 
hermeneutical injustice, I dissolve some ambiguities surrounding the primary harm of 
hermeneutical injustice, arguing that the primary KDUPLVWKDWWKHVXEMHFW¶VH[SHULHQFHODFNV
intelligibility, either cognitively or communicatively. Third, I provide a more nuanced 
account of hermeneutical resources that makes it easier to track the extent of hermeneutical 
gaps relative to various social groups and individuals. This fine-grained picture of the 
hermeneutical economy allows us to distinguish six species of hermeneutical injustice. I then 
reflect on the corrective virtue of hermeneutical justice, given the complexities just 
introduced,FRQFOXGHE\UHWXUQLQJWR)RUG¶VVWRU\DQGVXPPDUL]LQJWKH extended account of 
hermeneutical injustice I have provided. 
COLLECTIVE RESOURCES AND DISSENTING COMMUNITIES 
According to Medina, Mason, and Dotson, the way Fricker presents the collective 
hermeneutical resource creates problems in accounting for hermeneutical dissent. Medina 
FODLPVWKDW³)ULFNHU¶VH[SUHVVLRQµWKHFROOHFWLYHKHUPHQHXWLFDOUHVRXUFH¶VWURQJO\VXJJHVWV
WKDWZHFDQSRRODOOWKHKHUPHQHXWLFDOUHVRXUFHVDYDLODEOHWRDOOJURXSV´0HGLQD, 103). 
According to Medina, Fricker presents the collective hermeneutical resource as cumulative: it 
refers to all of the interpretive tools in circulation across all discursive communities. Mason 
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and Dotson¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQLVVOLJKWO\GLIIHUHQW. Mason claims that Fricker presents the 
interpretive tools used by members of socially powerful groups as the only hermeneutical 
UHVRXUFHDYDLODEOHWRPDUJLQDOL]HGVXEMHFWVDQG³WKXVJORVVHVRYHULPSRUWDQWGLVWLQFWLRQV²in 
particular, distinctions between dominant and non-GRPLQDQWKHUPHQHXWLFDOUHVRXUFHV´
(Mason 2011, 300). Dotson makes much WKHVDPHFODLP³)ULFNHUVHHPVWRDVVXPHWKDWWKHUH
is but one set of collective hermeneutical resources that we are all equalO\GHSHQGHQWXSRQ´
(Dotson 2012, 31). According to Mason and Dotson, Fricker presents the collective 
hermeneutical resource as exhaustive: it is the only resource available. We can illustrate these 
interpretations using Venn diagrams (Figure 1): the shaded region is the collective 
hermeneutical resource and each circle represents some collection of hermeneutical tools. On 
0HGLQD¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ (a), the collective resource is the union of various community-
VSHFLILFKHUPHQHXWLFDOUHVRXUFHVRQ0DVRQDQG'RWVRQ¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ (b), the collective 
resource is the only hermeneutical resource. 
Because a gap in the collective hermeneutical resource that has been produced by 
hermeneutical marginalization is the background condition for hermeneutical injustice, these 
interpretations necessitate that a hermeneutical injustice can occur only in cases where no 
interpretive tools that could make that experience intelligible are available to anyone. Thus, 
Medina ³[finds] it problematic that Fricker operates with the working assumption that when 
there is a hermeneutical gap, a range of experiences will be rendered unintelligible for 
everybody´(Medina 2013, 101, his emphasis); Mason claims that ³when a hermeneutical 
lacuna exists with respect to the experiences of a marginalized group, everyone fails to 
understand´ (Mason 2011, 303, my emphasis); and Dotson makes thHVDPHSRLQW³for 
Fricker, the hermeneutical lacuna in hermeneutical injustice renders some experiences 
difficult to conceptualize for the marginalized and the perceiver alike´ (Dotson 2012, 32, my 
emphasis). 
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But if the hermeneutical gap must be global, then hermeneutical dissent is not 
FDSWXUHGE\RXUDFFRXQWRIKHUPHQHXWLFDOLQMXVWLFH2Q0HGLQD¶VUHDGLQJWKHFROOHFWLYH
resource extends across all the interpretive tools in circulation, regardless of who actually has 
them. Subjects in hermeneutically dissenting communities therefore avoid hermeneutical 
injustice because they have produced the interpretive tools required to understand their 
experiences²despite the absence of those tools in the repertoire of subjects in dominant 
social groups. But this gap in dominant hermeneutical resources leads to an interpretive 
breakdown when marginalized subjects attempt to explain their experiences to dominant 
subjects. Medina claims that the dominant subjects suffer an epistemic harm, in that they 
cannot obtain knowledge about the dissenters¶H[SHULHQFHV\HW³interestingly and crucially, 
the hermeneutical harms are wrongful for others, not for those upon whom the epistemic 
KDUPVDUHGLUHFWO\LQIOLFWHG´ (Medina 2013, 107, his emphasis). This phenomenon, Medina 
conclXGHVLVQRWDGGUHVVHGRQ)ULFNHU¶VDFFRXQWRIKHUPHQHXWLFDOLQMXVWLFH2Q0DVRQDQG
'RWVRQ¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQKRZHYHUKHUPHQHXWLFDOGLVVHQWFDQQRWHYHQEHDFFRXQWHGIRU,IWKH
collective hermeneutical resource is the only resource available, then for any interpretive tool 
at all, either everyone has it or no one does. Therefore, hermeneutical dissent is impossible²
but since we can point to clear cases of hermeneutical dissent, there must be something 
ZURQJLQ)ULFNHU¶VDFFRXQW 
In a recent piece, however, Fricker has resisted these LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVFODLPLQJWKDW³a 
commitment to the existence of localised interpretive practices that may perfectly capture a 
given range of experiences but whose meanings are not sufficiently shared across wider 
social space is already present at the heart of the original account of hermeneutical injustice´ 
(Fricker 2016, 167). That is to say, Fricker claims that her original account can already 
accommodate hermeneutical dissent. According to her, the collective hermeneutical resource 
is neitKHUFXPXODWLYHQRUH[KDXVWLYH³
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meanings that just about anyone can draw upon and expect those meanings to be understood 
across social space by just about anyone else. [It] contains those concepts and 
conceptualisations that are held LQFRPPRQ´ (Fricker 2016, 163, her emphasis). The 
hermeneutical gap is in the common resource that everyone has access to²and the existence 
of this gap does not at all imply that no one must have access to the required tools. Again, we 
can illustrate with a Venn diagram (Figure 2). According to Fricker (2016), the collective 
hermeneutical resource is the intersection of various community-specific resources. 
It is easy to placHKHUPHQHXWLFDOGLVVHQWRQ)ULFNHU¶VLQWHUVHFWLRQDODFFRXQWof the 
collective hermeneutical resource. The existence of a gap in the interpretive tools shared by 
all says nothing about the interpretive tools that may be available among the members of any 
particular JURXS7KDWJURXS¶VKHUPHQHXWLFDOGLVVHQWPD\VXFFHVVIXOO\SURGXFHWKH
interpretive tools that are needed to make intelligible sense of their experiences despite the 
gap in the collective hermeneutical resource. In fact, we can see hermeneutical dissent in 
DFWLRQLQVRPHRI)ULFNHU¶VRZQH[DPSOHVIURPKHUHDUOLHUZRUN&RQVLGHU:HQG\6DQIRUG¶V
experience of postpartum depression as recounted by Susan Brownmiller (1990). Sanford was 
an upper-class Republican woman struggling with depression after giving birth to her son, 
and she and her husband had been blaming her for these difficulties. A friend convinced 
Sanford to come along to a feminist consciousness-raising seminar, where she learned about 
postpartum depression, conceived as a medical condition and not a personal deficiency. 
Sanford came away with an understanding of her experience that made better sense of her 
predicament and helped her to realize that the way she was feeling was not her fault. Fricker 
describes Sanford as suffering a hermeneutical injustice: the collective hermeneutical 
resource did not provide the appropriate interpretive tools for Sanford to properly understand 
her experience, because women were hermeneutically marginalized. And yet, feminist 
activists had produced the needed interpretive tools, despite the collective gap and despite 
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their hermeneutical marginalization qua women. Clearly, Fricker intends her account to have 
room for hermeneutical dissent. 
This defeats the version the worry raised by Mason and Dotson that hermeneutical 
injustice cannot accommodate hermeneutical dissent²but it does not yet fully answer 
0HGLQD¶VZRUU\DERXWFDVHVZKHUHKHUPHQHXWLFDOGLVVHQWHUVDUHXQDEOHWRPDNHWKHPVHOYHV
understood to dominant subjects. As was the case for agender people in the Ford case, it is 
unclear whether the feminist activists in the Sanford case suffer a hermeneutical injustice. 
That our account has space for hermeneutical dissent does not yet show that hermeneutical 
dissenters are subject to hermeneutical injustice. 
THE HARMS OF HERMENEUTICAL INJUSTICE REVISITED 
In order to show that the interpretive breakdown between hermeneutical dissenters and 
ignorant subjects constitutes a hermeneutical injustice, we must re-examine the harms of 
hermeneutical injustice. We have already seen that a gap in the collective hermeneutical 
UHVRXUFHRZLQJWRWKHVXEMHFW¶VKHUPHQHXWLFDOPDUJLQDOL]DWLRQGRHVVRPHkind of harm to the 
paradigmatic subjects of both hermeneutical injustice and hermeneutical dissent. If the harms 
in both cases turn out to be the same, we ought to identify hermeneutical dissenters as 
suffering hermeneutical injustice as well. 
But it may seem that the harms suffered in each case are distinct. On the one hand, 
some instances produce communicative harms. In these cases, the subject is not prevented 
from acquiring knowledge of her experience, but she is prevented from sharing that 
knowledge because others find her testimony unintelligible. On the other hand, Medina, 
Mason, and Dotson all concentrate on cases that produce cognitive harms. In these cases, the 
subject herself is unable to attain knowledge of her experience in the first place. Both the 
communicative harm and the cognitive harm undermine the VXEMHFW¶VFDSDFLW\DVDNQRZHU²
the former by impairing her ability to share knowledge, the latter by preventing her from 
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DFTXLULQJNQRZOHGJH)ULFNHU¶VDFFRXQWseems to waver between these two harms when it 
comes to which is the primary harm of hermeneutical injustice. In order to understand 
whether hermeneutical injustice afflicts hermeneutically dissenting subjects, we must clear up 
this ambiguity. 
 On the one hand, Fricker sometimes claims that the primary harm is communicative: 
³the primary harm of hermeneutical injustice consists in a situated hermeneutical inequality: 
the concrete situation is such that the subject is rendered unable to make communicatively 
intelligible something which it is particularly in his or her interests to be able to render 
intelligible,´ZKLFKDPRXQWVWR³prejudicial exclusion from the spread of knowledge´ (Fricker 
2007, 162, my emphasis). We can see this most clearly in another RI)ULFNHU¶VH[DPSOHV
ZKLFKVKHWDNHVIURP,DQ0F(ZDQ¶VQRYHOEnduring Love (McEwan 1998). 7KHQRYHO¶V
protagonist, Joe Rose, is stalked and harassed by Jed Parry, a religious zealot deluded by an 
erotomaniacal misapprehension than Joe is in love with him. At key moments in the story, 
-RHWULHVWRFRPPXQLFDWHKLVH[SHULHQFHRI-HG¶Vbehavior to other people²first to his partner 
Clarissa, then to the police²but each time he is unable to make his experience intelligible to 
his interlocutors.<2> Importantly, Joe does not suffer a cognitive harm at all: he knows that 
there is something very wrong and potentially dangerous about Jed. Nevertheless, Joe, 
through no fault of his own, LVXQDEOHWRH[SODLQ-HG¶VPHQDFHLQDZD\that others find 
intelligible. Joe is harmed in his capacity as a knower because he is prevented from sharing 
his knowledge. 
 On the other hand, Fricker sometimes claims the that the primary harm is cognitive. 
One example is the case of sexual harassment alluded to earlier. Brownmiller (1990) 
describes the experience of Carmita Wood, a university employee who was sexually harassed 
by a male professor. Before Wood and other feminist activists came together to discuss these 
exSHULHQFHVLQYHQWLQJWKHWHUP³sexual harassment´ in the process, a collective 
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hermeneutical gap prevented Wood or anyone else from attaining knowledge of this 
experience. As Fricker puts it³DSDWFKRIKHUVRFLDOH[SHULHQFHZKLFKLWZDVYHU\PXFKLQ
her interests to understand was not collectively understood, and so remained barely 
intelligible, even to her´ (Fricker 2007, 162, my emphasis).<3> Another example is the 
Sanford case described earlier. Fricker describes the moment Sanford realized that she was 
VXIIHULQJIURPSRVWSDUWXPGHSUHVVLRQDVD³revelation concerning an experience of female 
depression, previously illǦunderstood by the subject herself, because collectively ill-
understRRG´)ULFNHU 149, my emphasis). Wood and Sanford both were harmed in their 
capacity as knowers because they were prevented from acquiring knowledge of their 
experiences. 
 If we try to interpret either the communicative or the cognitive harm as the primary 
harm of hermeneutical injustice, we encounter problems accounting for all of the central 
cases and hermeneutical dissent. If the primary harm is communicative, then cases where the 
subject is unable to acquire knowledge of her experience will not count as instances of 
hermeneutical injustice, because the subject will have no knowledge to communicate at all. 
She will of course have communicative difficulties; Wood, for instance, is portrayed as both 
unable to intelligibly articulate and unable to acquire knowledge of her experience of sexual 
harassment. But this communicative trouble comes too late. The subject has already been 
harmed in her capacity as a knower before these communicative difficulties, which are not 
even of the same sort required for hermeneutical injustice²with no knowledge to 
communicate, the communicative harm simply cannot arise in the required way. This result is 
problematic because we can no longer account for the most troubling central cases (namely, 
FDVHVOLNH:RRG¶VRU6DQIRUG¶V as instances of hermeneutical injustice. Interpreting the 
primary harm as cognitive fares no better, because it forces us to exclude all cases where the 
subject has achieved knowledge of her experience. Consequently, both cases of 
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hermeneutical dissent DQG-RH¶VFDVHZLOOIDLOWRTXDOLI\DVKHUPHQHXWLFDOLQMXVWLFHVWe 
might be able to describe some other species of epistemic injustice to cover either 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶V losses, but it would be more satisfying if we had a unified account given that 
both harms have a common cause. 
 )ULFNHU¶VDFFRXQWLVDPELYDOHQWZKHQLWFRPHVWRZKLFKRI these two harms is primary. 
However, it is suggestive that she occasionally represents these harms disjunctively³the 
moment of hermeneutical injustice comes only when the background condition is realized in 
a more or less doomed attempt on the part of the subject to render an experience intelligible, 
either to herself or to an interlocutor´ (Fricker 2007, 159, my emphasis). The disjunction 
suggests that the two harms are both manifestations of a more general epistemic harm. 
Namely, I propose that the primary harm of hermeneutical injustice is that the subject has 
some distinctive and important social experience that at some crucial moment lacks 
intelligibility. That crucial moment may come when the subject tries to communicate 
knowledge she has about her experience to an interlocutor who lacks the required interpretive 
tools to find her testimony intelligibOH2ULWPD\DULVHLQWKHPRPHQWRIWKHVXEMHFW¶V
experience, where her own lack of the required interpretive tools leaves her without 
knowledge of that experience because it remains unintelligible even to her. So despite their 
apparent divergence, the communicative harm and the cognitive harm turn out to be instances 
of the same thing. Consequently, we can account for both hermeneutical dissent and all of 
)ULFNHU¶VH[DPSOHVDVLQVWDQFHVRIKHUPHQHXWLFDOLQMXVWLFH 
GLOBAL AND LOCAL HERMENEUTICAL ECONOMIES 
Whether the primary harm of hermeneutical injustice manifests communicatively or 
cognitively depends on where the gap in the collective hermeneutical resource appears. That 
is to say, the ZD\LQZKLFKWKHVXEMHFW¶VH[SHULHQFHODFNVLQWHOOLJLELOLW\LQWKHPoment she 
suffers a hermeneutical injustice depends on who, at that moment, has got the required 
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interpretive tools. But our account of hermeneutical injustice so far does not specify which 
epistemic agents and social groups have access to the required interpretive tools: a gap in the 
collective resource just means that at least someone lacks them. In order to better classify the 
different kinds of hermeneutical injustice we need a more precise account of hermeneutical 
resources that shifts our attention away from the global hermeneutical economy onto the local 
hermeneutical economies where dissent takes place. 
 ,Q)ULFNHU¶VPRUHUHFHQWZRUNVKHEHJLQVWRGLVWLQJXLVKGLIIHUHQWW\SHVRI
hermeneutical injustices along these linesXVLQJWKHODEHOV³maximal,´³PLGZD\,´DQG
³PLQLPDO´ (Fricker 2016). What is maximized or minimized is the extent of the 
KHUPHQHXWLFDOJDSDPRQJGLIIHUHQWVRFLDOJURXSV¶DQGLQGLYLGXDOV¶KHUPHQHXWLFDOWRROVHWV,Q
:RRG¶VFDVHPD[LPDOWKHKHUPHQHXWLFDOJDSLVJOREDOQRLQGLYLGXDOVor groups had the 
FRQFHSWRIVH[XDOKDUDVVPHQW,Q-RH¶VFDVHPLQLPDOWKHH[WHQWRIWKHJDSLVH[WUHPHO\
limited: ³he himself has no difficulty in understanding [his experience] and would easily be 
able to communicate to members of almost any social group,´ yet those to whom he most has 
interest in communicating²Clarissa and the police²seem not to have got the required 
interpretive tools (Fricker 2016, 166)7KH³PLGZD\´ band, however, is ambiguous between 
several different forms of hermeneutical injustice. In each case where a hermeneutical 
LQMXVWLFHRFFXUVDJDSLQWKHFROOHFWLYHKHUPHQHXWLFDOUHVRXUFHPLJKWUHSUHVHQWWKHVXEMHFW¶V
own lack of the required interpretive tools, or it may represent a lack among the members of 
various social group(s) to whom she attempts to make her experience communicatively 
intelligible. Moreover, the idiom of maximization±minimization still glosses over details; for 
the spread of interpretive tools from dissenting communities out into wider circulation does 
not happen evenly. Understanding the kinds of hermeneutical injustice that occur in cases of 
hermeneutical dissent requires further elaboration concerning these local hermeneutical 
resources. 
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Table 1 summarizes the possibilities. I have dropped permutations where the relevant 
tools are in the collective resource, because that implies that everyone has access to them. I 
have also dropped the permutation where the subject does not have the required tools despite 
her own social group having them: I am assuming that if a group has the required interpretive 
tools, then so do all of its members. This is of course an abstraction; certainly, it takes time 
for interpretive tools to disperse amongst the members of a discursive group, and its members 
may disagree. In such cases, however, it suffices to draw the line differently, circumscribing 
only the subgroup whose members agree. Note also that I am only interested in the 
hermeneutical resources of the subject herself and the hermeneutical resources of social 
groups to whose members the subject is attempting to communicate. People to whom the 
subject is not attempting to communicate may also lack the required interpretive tools, but 
this situation merely provides a necessary condition for hermeneutical injustice. Until the 
subject attempts to communicate with them, or they undergo the same sort of experience 
themselves, no hermeneutical injustice takes place. The result is six species of hermeneutical 
injustice.  
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 Who has the relevant interpretive tools? 
Type of injustice 
Collective 
Social group 
other than the 
VXEMHFW¶VRZQ 
6XEMHFW¶VRZQ
social group 
Subject 
Effacement X X X X 
Isolation X X X ݱ 
Separation X ݱ X X 
Ghettoization X X ݱ ݱ 
Exportation X ݱ X ݱ 
Obstruction X ݱ ݱ ݱ 
Table 1. The species of hermeneutical injustice. 
The first scenario is what I call hermeneutical effacement. This form of hermeneutical 
injustice occurs when the subject herself lacks the interpretive tools required to attain 
knowledge of her experience, and all interlocutors with whom she attempts to communicate 
also lack those tools. Moreover, the subject and others who undergo the experience are so 
severely hermeneutically marginalized that they have so far been prevented from organizing 
any effective hermeneutical dissent. In other words, this case arises when the hermeneutical 
gap extends globally, beyond just the collective. We can interpret the Wood case as being of 
this type. Prior to the consciousness-raising seminar, there were no communities or 
individuals that had developed interpretive tools that fully captured the experience of sexual 
harassment. Moreover, the women who experienced it had not had the opportunity to come 
together in a supportive environment that would have allowed them to develop the needed 
interpretive tools. The result was that the women suffered hermeneutical injustices not just 
because there was a gap in the shared store of interpretive tools, but also because no one with 
whom they attempted to communicate had the tools required, not even themselves. Their 
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experience of being sexually harassed thus lacked intelligibility in the moment of their 
experience, preventing them from acquiring knowledge about it. Thus, Wood suffered the 
cognitive harm. 
The second scenario is what I call hermeneutical isolation. This form of 
hermeneutical injustice occurs when a hermeneutically marginalized subject alone has the 
interpretive tools needed to make intelligible sense of her experience. That is, though the 
subject understands her experience well enough to achieve knowledge of it, none of her 
interlocutors has the required interpretive tools to make sense of her attempts to share that 
knowledge. Moreover, her hermeneutical marginalization interferes with other agents or 
JURXSVWDNLQJXSWKHVXEMHFW¶Vinterpretation of her experience, preventing her from engaging 
in hermeneutical dissent with any who may be similarly situated. In these situations, the 
subject will not suffer the cognitive harm, because she is able to acquire knowledge of her 
experience, but she will suffer the communicative harm every time she attempts to 
communicate about that experience. We might be skeptical about whether such cases can 
occur as a result of DVXEMHFW¶VORQH hermeneutical dissent. As Wittgenstein argues, a subject 
who invented her own term or concept for a specific experience of hers cannot be sure that 
her applications of that term or concept are consistently tracking the same thing. On his view, 
the only way these hermeneutical tools can acquire a determinate meaning is for a community 
to take them up into their practices and to reach a point where the members of that 
community tacitly agree on public features indicating that applying those interpretive tools is 
appropriate.<4> Arguably, it is only at this point that the subject could acquire knowledge of 
her experience using these tools. Hermeneutical dissent might EHJLQZLWKDQLQGLYLGXDO¶V
inchoate hermeneutical innovations, but in order to succeed in eliminating the cognitive harm 
the dissent must be brought to fruition through social processes.  
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However, there are cases where hermeneutical isolation can occur without 
hermeneutical dissent, such as when a subject becomes permanently cut off from the 
community in which she was brought up. For example, consider the ongoing extinction of 
indigenous cultures with distinctive languages and ways of thinking. Suppose the last 
VXUYLYLQJPHPEHURIRQHVXFKFXOWXUHOLYHVDPRQJPHPEHUVRIWKHUHJLRQ¶VQRZGRPLQDQW
community. His practically extinct culture gave him distinctive hermeneutical resources for 
interpreting some of his experiences²say, aspects of hunting²which his neighbors do not 
share, but which for him hold a distinctive practical and spiritual significance. If his 
neighbors do not make an effort to take up his indigenous interpretive tools, they may find his 
interpretations of hunting to be unintelligible. In WKLVFDVHWKHVXUYLYRU¶VKHUPHQHXWLFDOWRROV
KDYHFRPHRXWRIKLVH[WLQFWFRPPXQLW\¶VSUDFWLFHVVRWKH\ZLOOUHPDLQGHWHUPLQDWHHQRXJK
for him to have knowledge of his experience. But, he will be frustrated in all his attempts to 
make his interpretations intelligible to his neighbors, owing to a gap in their interpretive tools. 
He thus suffers the communicative harm. Over time, the lack of social reinforcement from 
members of his extinct community may also cause him to lose his grip on those interpretive 
tools, whittling away at his interpretations until he can no longer be certain he is applying 
them correctly²in the end, he may suffer a cognitive harm by losing the knowledge he once 
had. 
The third scenario is what I call hermeneutical separation. This form of 
hermeneutical injustice occurs when the subject lacks the interpretive tools she needs make 
sense of her own experience, and has been unable to engage in hermeneutical dissent with 
members of her own social group, yet at the same time the required tools are in use by 
members of a hermeneutically marginalized social group to which the subject does not 
belong. Once the subject comes into contact with these sympathetic strangers, her attempts to 
explain and understand KHUH[SHULHQFHPD\³click.´ Those with the needed interpretive tools 
16 
PD\UHFRJQL]HWKHVXEMHFW¶VH[SHULHQFHDVVRPHWKLQJIDPLOLDUWRWKHPRUWKHVXEMHFWPD\
recognize her experience in the testimony of those in the other group. The Sanford case 
illustrates this kind of hermeneutical injustice. As we have seen, before attending the 
consciousness-raising seminar, she had no resources to come to an accurate and fully 
intelligible understanding of her own experience of postpartum depression. At the same time, 
feminists, a community to which Sanford did not belong because of her political affiliations, 
had developed those resources. Because Sanford did not have the hermeneutical resources at 
her disposal to acquire knowledge of her own experience, she suffered the cognitive harm 
until she had internalized the interpretive tools offered to her by the consciousness-raisers.  
The fourth scenario is what I call hermeneutical ghettoization. This form of 
hermeneutical injustice occurs when the subject belongs to a hermeneutically marginalized 
group whose members have engaged in hermeneutical dissent in order to acquire knowledge 
of their distinctive experience and to communicate about it amongst themselves. But, because 
RIWKLVJURXS¶VPDUJLQDOL]DWLRQQRRWKHUFRPPXQLWLHVKDYHDFTXLUHGVXFKDQXQGHUstanding, 
so the subject cannot make her experience intelligible to members of other groups. One of 
)ULFNHU¶VQHZHUH[DPSOHVFDSWXUHVWKLVW\SHRIKHUPHQHXWLFDOLQMXVWLFH6KHGUDZVRQ0LNH
DQG7UHYRU3KLOOLSV¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHmigration of non-white Commonwealth citizens to the 
United Kingdom after the Second World War (Phillips and Phillips 1998). Black colonial 
immigrants interpreted their experiences as a struggle to be granted their rights as British 
citizens, whereas white Brits often viewed the issue as one of accepting or rejecting black 
migrants into British society without regard for their civic rights)ULFNHUVXPPDUL]HV³One 
could say the concept of a black British citizen had not yet taken hold in white British 
consciousness´ (Fricker 2016, 168). Because the black immigrants were frustrated in their 
attempts to communicate their knowledge of their civic rights to white Brits, they suffered the 
communicative harm. 
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The fifth scenario is what I call hermeneutical exportation. This form of 
hermeneutical injustice occurs when the subject acquires interpretive tools from a social 
group other than any of her own, and attempts to communicate with people in her own social 
group who have not acquired those tools. The subject is thus able to acquire knowledge of her 
experience and to share her knowledge with members of that other social group, but not to 
people in her own group. Moreover, her hermeneutical marginalization hinders her attempts 
to import those tools into her local communities.<5> For example, we might imagine Sanford 
coming home from the feminist seminar and trying to explain the idea of postpartum 
depression to her husband. From what little we know of him²namely, that he was a white, 
upper-class, conservative, U.S. American cis man²we ZRXOGH[SHFWKLPWRUHMHFW6DQIRUG¶V
new characterization of her condition. It is easy to imagine Sanford trying to explain that her 
depression is rooted in changes to her physiology (which are out of her control) and in social 
isolation (in which he is implicated), and he finding all of this unintelligible, retorting that 
WKRVH³radical man-hateUV´KDYH³SXWLGHDVLQKHUKHDG´ When our imagined Sanford 
attempts to communicate the knowledge she has about her postpartum depression to her 
husband, she suffers the communicative harm. Such cases may generally be a prelude to a 
change of group membership: when people in your own community dismiss your 
interpretations of your own experience, the ensuing alienation is likely to spur you to leave 
for a more supportive group. In the end, Brownmiller tells us that Sanford divorced her 
husband, became a feminist activistDQG³GLVFRYHUHGKHUOHVELDQLGHQWLW\´ (Brownmiller 1990, 
185).  
The sixth scenario is what I call hermeneutical obstruction. This form of 
hermeneutical injustice occurs when the subject, her own social group, and at least some 
social groups to which she does not belong have all got the required interpretive tools to 
make her experience intelligible, but there remain some social groups and individuals who 
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have not yet acquired them, and so those interpretive tools fail to pass into the collective 
resource. To count as a hermeneutical injustice, the subject must still be subject to 
hermeneutical marginalization: despite the relatively favorable hermeneutical climate, 
socially dominant interpretations still run against her and her allies. Moreover, some socially 
GRPLQDQWJURXSVPD\EHDFWLYHO\UHVLVWLQJWKHVSUHDGRIWKHVXEMHFW¶VGLVVHQWLQJ
interpretations. For example, let us continue our imagined biography of Sanford. Suppose 
that (as may in fact be the case) DIWHUVKHMRLQHGWKHIHPLQLVWFRPPXQLW\WKHZRPHQ¶V health 
movement succeeded in exporting their understanding of postpartum depression to a 
significant segment of the U.S. American population. And yet, suppose the dominant cultural 
understanding of such experiences continues to run against their interpretations: the feminist 
activists, now including Sanford, are still hermeneutically marginalized qua women. Sanford 
would now be able to communicate her knowledge intelligibly to a wider range of people, but 
that intelligibility would continue to fail with interlocutors who have not taken up the 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRIWKHZRPHQ¶VKHDOWKPRYHPHQW, especially those actively resisting them. At 
this stage, our imagined Sanford would still be subject to hermeneutical injustice in her 
attempts to communicate her knowledge to some people, suffering the communicative harm. 
My imagined extensions of the Sanford case also show how the hermeneutical 
injustices to which one is subjected might change over time. As I presented it, Sanford 
initially suffers hermeneutical separation, then, after internalizing the feminist conception of 
postpartum depression, she suffers hermeneutical exportation, and finally, after becoming a 
feminist herself, she suffers hermeneutical obstruction. These kinds of fluctuations occur 
EHFDXVHRIFKDQJHVLQWKHVXEMHFW¶VJURXSPHPEHUVKLSDQGLQGLIIHUHQWSDUWLHV¶KHUPHQHXWLFDO
resources. The subject may find it epistemically illuminating to expose herself to and to 
internalize the interpretive tools in use by other social groups, possibly going so far as to 
change her group membership. Social groups, too, may take up interpretive tools from one 
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another. In addition to the examples above, we could imagine a Sanford who never attended 
the consciousness-raising seminar, but whose own social group (say, upper-class Americans) 
eventually acquired the feminist conception of postpartum depression, bringing an end to her 
hermeneutical injustice without any change in her group membership. Where the subject is a 
member of multiple social groups, some of which have got the required hermeneutical tools 
and some of which do not, she will not suffer a hermeneutical injustice when communicating 
with members of the former group, but she will when communicating with members of the 
latter. So if Sanford had carried on as a conservative after becoming a feminist, and her 
fellow conservatives did not take up the feminist conception of postpartum depression, she 
would continue to suffer hermeneutical exportation among conservatives even though she 
would suffer no hermeneutical injustice among feminists. 
These distinctions illustrate just how complex local hermeneutical economies can be, 
with diverse social groups circulating dominant and dissenting interpretive tools among 
individuals who may come into contact with differently situated groups. Hermeneutical 
dissent is not a straightforward process of inventing interpretive tools for marginal 
experiences and pushing them out to a wider and wider congregation. Different social groups 
and individuals may acquire or resist interpretive tools from other social groups, meaning that 
filling in collective gaps proceeds unevenly²and not, as Fricker (2016) suggests, in a 
straight line from the maximal form of the injustice (effacement) to the minimal form 
(obstruction). My account brings out these details and allows us to fully appreciate the 
complexities of hermeneutical dissent while still recognizing the hermeneutical injustices that 
dissenting subjects suffer. 
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HERMENEUTICAL JUSTICE 
I have so far said little about how to correct for these various manifestations of hermeneutical 
injustice. Fricker proposes an ethical-epistemic virtue of hermeneutical justice, which she 
defines as:  
an alertness or sensitivity to the possibility that the GLIILFXOW\RQH¶VLQWHUORFXWRULV
having as she tries to render something communicatively intelligible is due not to its 
being a nonsense or her being a fool, but rather to some sort of gap in collective 
hermeneutical resources. (Fricker 2007, 169) 
Minimally, when the virtuous hearer encounters a speaker whose testimony seems barely 
intelligible, and whom he recognizes is likely to be hermeneutically marginalized, he is 
required to give the speaker the benefit of the doubt and assume that even though he does not 
understand what has been said, the speaker is not spouting nonsense. In favorable conditions, 
the hearer and speaker may be able to carry on an extended conversation aimed at producing 
or sharing the required interpretive tools so that both parties are able to make sense of the 
PDUJLQDOL]HGVXEMHFW¶VH[SHULHQFH 
 Reflecting on hermeneutical dissent helps us see the requirements of hermeneutical 
justice in more detail. The virtuous hearer will be aware that the hermeneutical economy is in 
flux and subject to manipulation by social power. Consequently, he will understand that the 
interpretive tools that are available to him and to others will not always be the same, and will 
not always be adequate. In particular, he will be aware that different social groups may have 
developed better interpretive tools for their distinctive experiences. In situations where the 
subject seems to show a clear understanding of some experience that sounds unintelligible to 
his ears, the virtuous hearer will demonstrate a form of epistemic humility with respect to the 
interpretive tools he is accustomed to using. That is, he is willing to admit that his interpretive 
tools are fallible²especially with respect to the experiences of the marginally situated. This 
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humility does not mean that he would uncritically accept any and all dissenting interpretive 
tools. Rather, he simply understands that those who are differently situated may know better 
than him when it comes to their own experiences. 
 ThHKHDUHU¶VYLrtuous activity may continue into helping to ³generate a more inclusive 
hermeneutical micro-climate through the appropriate kind of dialogue with the speaker´ 
(Fricker 2007, 171). The virtuous hearer may, that is, be drawn into participation in 
hermeneutical dissent. He may actively help to create a space where the speaker can try out 
different ways of articulating herself in the search for an intelligible account of her 
H[SHULHQFH2UKHPD\EHGUDZQWRVSHDNZLWKPRUHSHRSOHLQWKHVSHDNHU¶VVLWXDWLRQLQthe 
hopes of understanding the hermeneutical tools they are already using but which are not 
collectively available and not yet locally available to him. The aim of hermeneutical justice is 
to understand these dissenting interpretations of our social world before subjecting them to 
criticism, and, if they are found to be well-formed, to spread them more widely. 
In cases of hermeneutical separation, the virtuous hearer may be able to direct the 
subject to a hermeneutically dissenting social group that has ready-made interpretive tools for 
exactly the kind of experience the subject is struggling to understand for herself. The virtuous 
hearer may even be a member of that dissenting group, and able to teach the needed 
interpretive tools directly. This role of hermeneutical dissenters in redressing hermeneutical 
gaps suggests a further proactive move that a virtuous dissenter may make: fighting their 
hermeneutical marginalization through activism and advocacy. Such efforts aim at spreading 
dissenting hermeneutical tools to a wider audience, in the hope that those who need them to 
make sense of their experiences will take them up and that virtuous hearers who do not share 
such experiences will take those interpretations seriously. 
 Hermeneutical justice is not without its critics, however. Elizabeth Anderson worries 
)ULFNHU¶VDFFRXQWIRFXVes too much on the virtues of individual epistemic agents. Individual 
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virtues may be enough to correct for hermeneutical injustices in particular interactions 
between marginalized and virtuous subjects, but, Anderson argues, the structural problem 
will remain: 
in the face of massive structural injustice, individual epistemic virtue plays a 
comparable role to the practice of individual charity in the context of massive 
structural poverty. Just as it would be better and more effective to redesign economic 
institutions so as to prevent mass poverty in the first place, it would be better to 
reconfigure epistemic institutions so as to prevent epistemic injustice from arising. 
Structural injustices call for structural remedies. (Anderson 2012, 171) 
Anderson argues that greater social integration would serve as a structural remedy for 
hermeneutical injustice. Breaking down social barriers between communities will help to 
counteract structural problems that reinforce hermeneutical gaps and obstructions. Her ideal 
of integration requires all social groups to participate equally in epistemic activities²
including a requirement that they be fairly represented in hermeneutically influential 
professions such as politics, academia, and journalism²which also requires equal access to 
the kinds of education that best develop knowledge and intellectual virtue. 
 ,WLVHDV\WRSODFHKHUPHQHXWLFDOGLVVHQWLQ$QGHUVRQ¶VLQVWLWXWLRQDOaccount of 
hermeneutical justice. Greater community integration would provide more opportunities for 
hermeneutically dissenting social groups to popularize their interpretive tools. Greater 
educational equality would empower members of marginalized groups by giving them the 
intellectual resources and social standing to aid in organizing hermeneutical dissent. Fair 
representation of diverse social groups in hermeneutically influential professions and 
positions would help eliminate their hermeneutical marginalization by giving them a platform 
from which to explain their dissenting interpretations, and the authority to make them 
widespread topics of conversation. Hermeneutically just institutions would help to make 
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dissenting interpretive tools part of the hermeneutical mainstream, reducing the extent of 
interpretive gaps. 
Finally, the Sanford case raises another possibility: the subject of a hermeneutical 
injustice may be prevented from acquiring the very interpretive tools she needs if she herself 
lacks the virtue of hermeneutLFDOMXVWLFH,PDJLQHWKDW6DQIRUG¶VIULHQGKDGQHYHUGUDJJHGKHU
to the consciousness-raising group, and her continued association with her conservative social 
group further alienated her from the feminist community. It is conceivable that even if she 
then heard of postpartum depression, she would find that interpretation of her symptoms 
unintelligible. Without the virtue of hermeneutical justice, she would be unable to experience 
the moment of hermeneutical ³revelatiRQ´ Fricker describes. Hermeneutical justice is 
therefore not only important for ensuring that the experiences of others are not unduly 
dismissed: it may open our minds to better ways of interpreting our own experiences. 
GENDERLESS DISSENT 
To conclude, let us take stock by returning to the Ford case. Hermeneutical marginalization 
occurs when a group or individual is unfairly excluded from participating in the development 
of the collective hermeneutical resource. As a result, the tools available in the collective 
hermeneutical resource may be inadequate to interpret the distinctive and important social 
experiences of marginalized people. This has long been the case for LGBTQ+ folk, especially 
those like Ford who identify with non-binary genders. I have argued, following Fricker, that 
the collective resource ought to be conceived as those interpretive tools which are shared in 
common, and not as a cumulative or exhaustive catalogue of all the interpretive tools there 
are. A gap in the common hermeneutical toolset is the background condition for 
hermeneutical injustice. As Ford writes, they initially had never encountered the very idea of 
non-binary gender identities, much less genderless identities³$WWKLVSRLQWJHQGHUIOXLGLW\
and gender neutrality was not being discussed in the media as it is today by celebrities such 
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as Miley Cyrus and Shamir Bailey...Back then, I had never seen the topic addressed publicly, 
RUE\DQ\RQHLQP\OLIH´)RUG. The hermeneutical marginalization of LGBTQ+ folk 
produced a collective gap in interpretive resources surrounding the experience of being 
agender. 
 The primary harm of hermeneutical injustice, I argued, can appear in two ways. On 
WKHRQHKDQGZKHQWKHKHUPHQHXWLFDOJDSDSSHDUVRQKHULQWHUORFXWRU¶VVLGHLWPD\LPSDLU
WKHVXEMHFW¶V ability to communicate her knowledge of her experience. On the other hand, 
ZKHQWKHJDSDSSHDUVRQWKHVXEMHFW¶VVLGHLWZLOOSUHYHQWKHUIURPDFTXLULQJthis knowledge 
in the first place. The communicative and cognitive harms are both manifestations of the 
same primary harm: at some crucial moment WKHVXEMHFW¶V experience lacks intelligibility. At 
different stages, Ford was subject to both: at first, they did not understand their own 
experience of being agender. After they joined the relevant LGBTQ+ communities, they 
acquired the necessary interpretive tools to acquire knowledge of their experience. But they 
still encounter resistance to their genderless identity in encounters with many people who 
find such experiences unintelligible. 
Some LGBTQ+ communities, engaging in hermeneutical dissent, have developed 
interpretive tools in order to acquire knowledge of their experiences of being genderless, 
among other experiences. But the spread of dissenting interpretive tools into the collective is 
not a process of straightforward accumulation. My taxonomy of hermeneutical injustices 
tracks whether the subject, her own social group, or other social groups, have picked up the 
required interpretive tools. With the fine-grained distinctions among hermeneutical resources 
WKDW,KDYHSUHVHQWHGZHFDQWUDFN)RUG¶Vstory through several kinds of hermeneutical 
injustice. They were at first subject to hermeneutical separation, when they had not yet 
encountered people in LGBTQ+ communities who had developed the concept of 
genderlessness. After acquiring this concept and joining those communities, Ford became 
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subject to hermeneutical ghettoization, when trying to communicate to social groups other 
than their own, and hermeneutical exportation, when trying to communicate to their own non-
LGBTQ+ social groups. 
 Given these local hermeneutical complexities, the virtue of hermeneutical justice 
demands that virtuous hearers be on the lookout for and participate in hermeneutical dissent, 
to better understand the social experiences of others, and perhaps even their own. Ford is a 
good example of such a person, having come to LGBTQ+ communities with an open but 
critical mind, hoping to make better sense of their own experience. )RUG¶V advocacy, public 
appearances, and writing also demonstrate their commitment to furthering LGBTQ+ 
FRPPXQLWLHV¶ hermeneutical dissent and eliminating their marginalization by disseminating 
their interpretive tools to a wider audience. )RUG¶VDUWLFOHDOVRLQVWDQWLDWHVDQinstitutional 
solution to hermeneutical injustice. By making space in its pages for people who, like Ford, 
come from hermeneutically marginalized groups, The Guardian has lent its institutional 
authority as a media organization to marginalized voices. Eliminating hermeneutical injustice, 
in all its forms, will require further commitments on the part of institutions and individuals to 
hermeneutical justice. 
NOTES 
My thanks to Miranda Fricker, Paul Faulkner, Rebecca Mason, Charlie Crerar, Simon Barker, 
attendees at the 2016 Congress of the Canadian Philosophical Association, the Sheffield 
feminism reading group, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on earlier 
versions of this paper. 
1. For instance, see the feminist standpoint tradition, summarized by Anderson (2015, §2). 
2. Unlike systematic cases where an entire social group is hermeneutically marginalized, 
tracking them across multiple aspects RIWKHLUOLYHV-RH¶VPDUJLQDOL]DWLRQLVRIDQLQFLGHQWDO
type, affecting him only in a very limited aspect of his epistemic life. 
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3. It remains slightly obscure exactly what Fricker means when she says that an experience is 
³EDUHO\LQWHOOLJLEOH.´,WFDQQRWEHWKHFDVHWKDWWKHVXEMHFW¶VH[SHULHQFHLVVRUDGLFDOO\
unintelligible that it cannot figure in her thought at all; for then it would seem impossible that 
she could engage in hermeneutical dissent or any other interpretive activity regarding that 
H[SHULHQFH,QVRPHFDVHVWKHVXEMHFW¶VQDVFHQWXQGHUVWDQGLQJPD\DPRXQWWRVRPHIRUPRI
epistemic achievement that remains less coherent than propositional belief, perhaps what 
6KRWZHOOFDOOV³LPSOLFLWXQGHUVWDQGLQJ´,QRWKHUFDVHVVXFKDV6DQIRUG¶VWKHVXEMHFW
may instead have a perfectly intelligible yet false belief about her experience. Regardless, the 
subject is prevented from acquiring knowledge of her experience. 
4. See Wittgenstein (1997, §§243±275). 
5. A worry might be raised at this point, recalling the Wittgensteinian problem for 
hermeneutical isolation: without being a member of the dissenting social group whose forms 
of life have given the required hermeneutical tool a determinate meaning, we might think that 
the subject of hermeneutical exportation cannot consistently apply that hermeneutical tool 
which she has borrowed to alleviate the cognitive harm. This worry is only half right. There 
will be a kind of inauthentic appropriation of hermeneutical tools, where the subject lifts a 
term or concept from an alien culture without fully understanding its meaning. In such 
circumstances, she will not achieve knowledge of her experience after all, because she does 
QRWUHDOO\XQGHUVWDQGWKHRWKHUJURXS¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQs. But where the subject has had a more 
significant and ongoing interaction with the other group, it is plausible to think that she could 
internalize some of their hermeneutical tools, and keep them on track. 
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